One asset, three seats. The DDAS acquisition, the Farooq collaboration, and the operator succession plan — viewed from ownership, from Steve's chair, and from David's.
What's changed in this version (for anyone working from a printout)
June 10 · 2:15 PM MT
Core/overflow line — assessed, happy medium settled: the test is source, not volume. Steve-originated Alberta business stays core at 60% at any volume, up to the existing ~$550–600K comp cap (≈1.75× baseline — consistent with the $400K cap he's already seen). Platform-originated business and the East Coast are overflow from dollar one (Farooq collab ~10% of our net; East Coast 40–50% after travel). The 1.25× line (≈$650K) is kept only as the tie-breaker for ambiguous/co-originated deals — a pure volume cut would have paid 60% on Farooq deals in slow years and clawed Steve's own deals to 10% in hot ones.
Maritimes reclassified as overflow: outside the 60% pool; our net splits with Steve ~40–50% after travel & accommodation, with worked math.
New — East Coast travel fund: a capped $10–15K/yr business-development travel budget (flights home + accommodation) as a deal sweetener.
New — Post-close rollout sequencing (this tab): how to introduce the Farooq collaboration after closing — close clean → deliver promises → reopen the conversation Steve already had → pilot two Lane 2 deals → formalize — with honesty guardrails.
New — Steve's cut of the collaboration (this tab): his core book stays at 60% untouched; Farooq is pitched as overflow support, and Steve earns ~10% of DDAS's net share on overflow deals, with an optional post-step-back trailer.
Removed: Steve's son-in-law as a successor candidate (Steve tab) — he's out.
June 10 · ~10:00 AM MT
Inside Farooq's playbook: appraisal product, fee philosophy, $2M floor, portfolio endgame — distilled from his materials.
Two-lane model: pipeline mapped to Lane 1 (DDAS-led, sub-$2M) vs Lane 2 (co-brand); sandbox split now applies only to Lane 2, with an honest dilution note at today's pricing.
David's tab: insurance licence track and personal recurring book added.
Correction: pipeline total is $412K, not $422K (Westmor = $40K at 4%).
The thesis: Davidson's brand and Alberta relationships + Farooq's appraisal engine and service stack + an operator we develop (David) = the dominant dental transaction platform in Western Canada. Steve gives us 3–5 years of brand continuity and mentorship; Farooq gives us execution quality that wins clients in a single meeting; David gives us a way to own the operating layer without founder time.
Farooq / ADA CPAAppraisals · due diligence · lawyers & banks · deal execution
→
Closed dealsCo-branded appraisals · fee split · larger average fees
→
EcosystemAdvisory · insurance · real estate · investment arm
The moat is not the brokerage. It's the relationship network — every closed transaction creates a dentist who trusts us at the most important financial moment of their career. Each service arm is a monetization layer on that trust.
The two engines, side by side
6 deals
Steve's current pipeline
$412K total commissions
~$69K
Steve's avg fee (≈3.0% blended)
Small deals, thin pricing
6 + 14
Farooq: closed YTD + pipeline
$1M+ in Q1 alone
~$250K
Farooq's historical avg fee
~3.5× Steve's per deal
The gap is the opportunity. Farooq wins clients in one meeting by showing how his appraisals and process differ — and his appraisals genuinely are better. Plugging Davidson's deal flow into Farooq-grade pricing, packaging, and extra services is the single fastest value lever we own.
Inside Farooq's playbook (from his materials)
The appraisal product
40-page institutional-grade reports: clinic profile & photos, capacity analysis, patient & procedure analytics, normalized financials, three forecast scenarios (no-growth, growth, 50% partnership) and four valuation methods (EBITDA multiple, revenue multiple, DCF, asset value). This is what wins listings in one meeting.
The fee philosophy
Value-creation framing, not commission framing: work fees (~$30K) plus success fees tied to outcomes — e.g. 0.75% on financing raised, 10% of interest savings, 25%-of-uplift commission structures. He quantifies the value he creates, then prices against it.
The $2M floor
Farooq targets practices worth no less than ~$2M. He structurally ignores the volume end of the market — small GP practices, hygiene clinics, associate buy-ins. That end is Davidson's bread and butter.
The portfolio endgame
His Portfolio Sale Process: bundle 25–30 committed clinics and sell at 11.5–12x EBITDA vs. 7.5–8.5x standalone — a 50–60% valuation arbitrage to DSO/PE buyers, with PowerDent360 powering due diligence. A brokerage network like ours is exactly the feedstock.
Two lanes, no turf war. Four of Steve's six pipeline deals sit below Farooq's $2M floor — the books barely overlap. The model is segmentation, not competition: Lane 1 — DDAS-led (sub-$2M practices, buy-ins, transitions; David's training ground; DDAS keeps 100%). Lane 2 — co-branded ($2M+ practices: DDAS originates, Farooq's engine executes, fee split). Lane 3 — later: portfolio process across the combined network for the step-change exit multiple.
Steve's pipeline (current), mapped to lanes
#
Practice
Location
Annual production
Est. value*
Rate
Commission
Lane
*Illustrative at 125–160% of production (Farooq's own standalone benchmark); actual value depends on EBITDA and practice specifics.
Deal economics sandbox — the Farooq collaboration
Co-branded deals: who earns what?
Applied to Steve's current pipeline ($13.7M production) for illustration. DDAS keeps 100% of Lane 1 deals (sub-$2M, $3.7M production); the split applies only to the two Lane 2 co-brand candidates (Three Hills + DSG, $10M production).
2.5% — discount broker3.0% — Steve today6.0% — full-service premium
30%50% — Farooq's floor as executor65% — Bronco keeps as originator today
DDAS
Farooq
—
Total fee pool (pipeline)
—
DDAS total (Lane 1 + Lane 2 share)
—
Farooq share (Lane 2 only)
—
DDAS uplift vs. today's $412K solo
The Bronco precedent is our benchmark. Bronco gets Farooq the meeting and does showings; Farooq does the valuation, the pitch, the lawyers, the banks — and currently keeps only 35% (~$300K across a handful of deals). He's trialling 5 deals and says it has to go to ≥50% after. Translation: origination is worth 50–65% of the fee, and that's exactly the asset Davidson + David bring. We can offer Farooq a better partner than Bronco — recurring co-branded flow, real back-end leverage from our team, ecosystem cross-sell — and still keep the originator's share.
Read the defaults honestly: at today's 3.0% pricing, splitting Lane 2 is dilutive on the existing pipeline. The collaboration only pays through what Farooq actually brings — premium pricing (move the first slider toward 4–5%: full-service appraisal packages justify it), higher win rates on listings, and bigger average deals. That's the bet, stated plainly.
One relationship, stacked fees
The anatomy of a single $2.5M practice sale once the full shelf is live — versus the ~$69K average fee Steve earns today:
Transaction fees
Brokerage commission4% full-service rate (gross, before any Lane 2 split)$100K
Deal-closing servicesLawyer & bank coordination, lender competition — or folded into a premium commission$20K
Disability / buy-sell policyFirst-year commission, David licensed$3K
Wealth management trail~$1.2M sale proceeds referred @ ~0.6% — Farooq's precedent: $15M client ≈ $100K/yr~$7K/yr
Practice consulting & dashboardsThe PowerDent360 pattern Dmitry already runs internally — sold to the buyer post-close~$12K/yr
Per relationship, compounding~$19K/yr
~2.2x the fee per transaction, plus an annuity that never existed before. And the buyer of the practice becomes the next decade's client — consulting, insurance, eventual resale. The relationship monetizes on both sides of every deal.
Alberta market & growth scenarios
~1,600
Dental practices in Alberta (est.)
~11% of Canada's ~15,000
~$2B
Annual AB clinic revenue (est.)
From $18B national market
60–100
Ownership transitions / yr (est.)
~4–6% annual turnover
5% → 20%
DSO penetration, Canada → US level
Consolidation tailwind for deal flow
Scenario engine — platform revenue at run-rate
Pick a preset or set your own assumptions. Network effect = more deals and bigger deals: Slade's clinics, Farooq's 500+ client base, and PowerDent360 surface listings Steve never saw.
Ramp assumption: 50% → 75% → 90% → 100% of run-rate over Y1–Y4 as David scales and the Farooq channel matures. WM trail and consulting accumulate (each year's referrals stack on the last). Alberta market figures are estimates for sizing only.
Acquisition structure (as proposed to Steve)
At close
$150K cash
Paid at initial closing — locks the deal, gives Steve day-one liquidity.
Years 1–3
60% of gross fees — on the book Steve originates
Steve & Lisa keep running the business and draw 60% of gross fees on Steve-originated Alberta business — his book and pipeline, at any volume — up to the absolute comp cap (~$550–600K/yr, raised to accommodate the pipeline). Platform-originated business and the East Coast are overflow, paid via overrides instead. Our team absorbs appraisal production, DD, and execution. DSG deal carved out at 75/25 given Steve's pre-deal origination work.
Years 4–10
Performance-based installments
Sized off avg Y1–3 uncapped earnings: 55 / 45 / 35 / 25 / 20 / 15 / 10%. Share sale → LCGE shelter for Steve & Lisa. PV at prime (4.45%): base ≈ $550K, growth ≈ $675K, stretch ≈ $800K.
Strong Y1–3 performance on Steve's core book flows directly into his payout — and collaboration overflow pays him an override on top (see Steve's cut below). Aligned incentives without paying 60% on revenue the Farooq engine creates.
Rolling out the Farooq collaboration — post-close sequencing
The purchase stands entirely on its own — we'd buy DDAS with or without Farooq. The collaboration is a growth initiative layered on after close, and Steve has already met Farooq once when we floated the idea. He didn't object; we just never followed up. So this is a follow-up, not a reveal.
Closing · day 0
Close clean
The purchase agreement is negotiated and priced on its own merits — no Farooq linkage in the documents, the pricing, or the conditions. If Steve raises Farooq before close, answer plainly: the idea we floated a few years ago is still on the shelf, nothing is agreed, and it changes nothing about his deal. Sequencing is fine; misrepresentation is not.
Months 1–3
Deliver the promises first
Operate exactly as the framework described: our team absorbs appraisal production, DD, and execution; the pipeline (incl. DSG at 75/25) closes cleanly; comp flows on schedule. Nothing new is introduced until the things we already committed to are visibly true. Trust before change.
Month 3–4
Reopen the conversation Steve already had
Framed as continuity: "Remember when we sat down with Farooq a few years back? Now that the dust has settled, we'd like to pilot what we discussed then." Frame Farooq as overflow support — capacity for deals beyond the existing book's size and volume, not a replacement for anything Steve does today. Bring the economics in writing — including Steve's ~10% override on our net — and the framework we sent him already said it: "any future co-branding with Farooq's firm would be a later conversation." This is that conversation, on schedule.
Months 4–9
Pilot two co-branded Lane 2 deals
Davidson-led, client-facing under the DDAS name; Farooq's appraisal engine works inside the cover. Full transparency with Steve on the split, the pricing uplift, and the win rate. Let the math make the argument — overflow deals pay him an override on business that otherwise wouldn't exist, while his core book and 60% comp stay untouched.
Months 9–12
Steve's verdict, then formalize
If the pilot worked, Steve has personally earned more from it. Formalize the playbook, set the standing split, and open the next chapter — including the Maritimes option if he wants it.
How this stays honest: the purchase never depends on the collaboration; the prior Farooq meeting makes this continuity rather than surprise; the branding commitment is kept literally (DDAS leads everything client-facing, co-branding appears only inside Lane 2 appraisal documents — exactly what the framework reserved for "a later conversation"); and Steve's economics only improve, demonstrated in writing. The test for every step: it has to survive full daylight. If a step only works because Steve doesn't see it, change the step — not the disclosure.
Steve's cut of the collaboration
Core
Core = deals Steve originates, at 60%
The 60% comp and installment mechanics apply to everything Steve originates in Alberta — at any volume — up to the absolute comp cap already drafted (~$550–600K/yr ≈ 1.75× his baseline revenue). A hot year on his own book never bumps him to override rates. Source, not volume, draws the line — consistent with (and better than) the $400K cap framing he has already seen.
The overflow
~10% of our net on collab deals
Farooq is pitched as overflow support — business the platform originates (Farooq's channel, our network, PowerDent360 leads) from dollar one, plus the East Coast territory by definition. That business sits outside the 60% pool; instead Steve earns ~10% of DDAS's net share (total fee less Farooq's cut). Example: $3M deal at 4% = $120K fee; 50/50 with Farooq leaves us $60K; Steve clips ~$6K on business that otherwise wouldn't exist.
The lock-in
Post-step-back trailer
Optionally, the override survives his step-back on deals sourced from relationships he originated — extending his pension-style tail. Turns Steve into the collaboration's long-term advocate instead of its monitor.
Why source beats volume (the happy medium): a pure 1.25× revenue cut misfires in both directions — it pays 60% on Farooq-channel deals in a slow year, and claws Steve's own deals down to override rates in a hot one (deadly optics given the pipeline he's bringing, and inconsistent with the comp cap we already raised to let that pipeline flow). So: the primary test is source — Steve-originated Alberta business is core at 60% up to the absolute cap; platform-originated business and the East Coast are overflow from dollar one. The 1.25× trailing-revenue line (≈$650K) survives as the tie-breaker for ambiguous or co-originated deals: below it, ambiguity resolves in Steve's favour; above it, to overflow. Attribution is recorded per listing at intake and reconciled monthly — a registry, not a debate. One decision remains: overflow revenue shouldn't feed his Y1–3 installment base — the override is his participation; otherwise we pay for the same dollar twice.
People & roles
Owners
Slade & Dmitry
Capital, strategy, M&A, governance. Not in the deal-flow day-to-day. Slade: leadership & growth calls. Dmitry: structure, finance, capital deployment.
Execution engine
Farooq (ADA CPA)
Appraisals, valuation, due diligence, lawyer/bank coordination. Initially a fee-split collaborator with co-branding; long-term structure (JV, merge, cross-equity) deliberately deferred.
Brand & mentor
Steve (+ Lisa)
Runs DDAS for 3–5 years, keeps the name on the door, trains the successor. Min 18-month commitment; step-down at his pace.
Operator partner
David Tumbach
Starts part-time (evenings — when tours happen anyway) while keeping his full-time role. Learns under Steve + Farooq, takes on deals, becomes partner and ultimately runs DDAS.
Bench
Zeph / Viran
Technology and investment arms once the transaction platform is producing cash and relationships.
Growth arms
Now
Brokerage & appraisals
Co-branded, Farooq-grade. The core fee engine.
Now
Buy-ins & successions
Smaller transactions — David's training ground, volume builder.
Now
Deal-closing services
Lawyer & bank coordination per transaction — $15–25K fee or folded into a premium commission. Farooq's lender-competition playbook (7 lenders, 40+ calls) is the template.
Next
Insurance (disability-first)
David gets LLQP-licensed. Disability, buy-sell, key-person — every transition surfaces the need. Offered across both books; Farooq takes an origination cut on his channel.
Next
Wealth management
Piggyback Farooq's WM arrangement — his precedent: one $15M client ≈ $100K/yr trail. Every sale creates investable proceeds; the trail is the platform's compounding annuity.
Next
Startup, build & procurement
Slade's equipment pricing extended to clients — new builds, renos, upgrades. Two models: flat planning/procurement fee, or beat-the-quote with 50/50 savings split. Reps get the aggregated volume; we get the pricing.
Next
Practice consulting & dashboards
Playbooks + the dashboard pattern Dmitry already runs on our own operations. EBITDA improvement → higher valuations → bigger exit fees.
Next
Maritimes & East Coast
Steve's chapter two: originate back home in Atlantic Canada under the DDAS brand, with appraisals, DD, and closing run remotely by the Farooq engine and our team. Underserved brokerage market, aging owner base. Treated as overflow outside the 60%; our net splits with Steve ~40–50%, after travel & accommodation.
Later
Real estate
Dental buildings, sale-leasebacks; ~$20M partner capital at 7–8% target.
Later
Investment arm
Internal capital first; family-office trajectory.
Later
IT services
Internalize → externalize as managed services.
Later
Analytics (PowerDent360)
The intelligence layer: exit-readiness and valuation scores feed DDAS deal flow.
Later
Portfolio sale process
Farooq's 11.5–12x bundling play, fed by the combined client network. The step-change exit for clients — and for us.
Open decisions
Long-term structure with Farooq
Start with fee-split + co-branded appraisals, no exclusivity — mirroring his Bronco trial. Decide in 12–24 months between: ongoing JV, merging DDAS-Alberta operations, or cross-equity. Deferring this is deliberate: we'll know far more about deal flow, who originates what, and David's trajectory.
Bronco channel overlap in Alberta
Bronco (ex-Patterson, built 150 clinics) feeds Farooq meetings in the same geography. Is Bronco a competitor channel, a parallel channel, or a future acquisition for us? Need to map territory and referral-source conflicts before co-branding broadly with Farooq.
When does David get equity, and in what?
Sweat-equity into DDAS OpCo is cleanest; options: phantom units during apprenticeship → real units at full-time conversion. Needs to coexist with whatever the Farooq structure becomes.
Reciprocal fee flows with Farooq
The relationship is becoming two-way: we pay him on Lane 2 brokerage; he pays us on insurance and procurement sold into his book; both clip the WM trail. Each flow is individually simple, but the net needs a clean, auditable schedule before volume builds — otherwise every deal becomes a negotiation.
Adopt Farooq's fee philosophy at DDAS?
Steve prices at flat 2–6% commissions; Farooq prices work fees + success fees against quantified value created (e.g. 25% of uplift above a baseline multiple). Migrating DDAS toward value-based pricing — at least on Lane 2 and advisory work — may be worth more than any volume growth. Needs care: Steve's clients chose him partly for simplicity.
Governance (still the biggest unresolved item)
HoldCo above all vs. per-venture JVs vs. ADA CPA staying fully separate. Needs legal/tax analysis before the Farooq relationship deepens past fee-splitting.
Maritimes timing & licensing
When to pilot (likely year 2+, after the Farooq collab is proven in Alberta), and what provincial licensing applies — practice sales that include premises or leaseholds can trigger real-estate/business-brokerage licensing rules that differ across NS/NB/PEI/NL. Also: does the East Coast book eventually feed David, a local hire, or stay Steve-sized by design? And the split mechanics — 50/50 of our net after travel/accommodation and deal costs (shared cost discipline), vs. a lower flat share (40–45%) with costs on us (simpler statements).
Focus discipline
The standing risk is too many opportunities, not too few. Phase 1 = brokerage/appraisals + buy-ins + David's development. Everything else waits until the core engine runs without founder time.
Steve's seat: keep running the business you built, under your name, with a team behind you — get paid well for the working years, then get paid for the business itself, structured so growth during your runway flows straight into your payout.
The baseline — Steve's own numbers (2022–23 disclosures)
~$530K
2022 billings (per Steve's email)
$500–550K
Fiscal 2023 range (Sept 30 YE)
$88.5K
Normalized EBITDA, FY2022 (16.7%)
Comp normalized at 40% of revenue
~$338K
Combined T1s — Steve $192K · Lisa $146K
These disclosures anchor the deal math: the absolute comp cap (~$550–600K/yr ≈ 1.75× baseline revenue), the 1.25× tie-breaker line (≈$650K/yr) for ambiguous deal attribution, and the standalone-FMV calibration (~$550K) behind the installment targets. Everything we propose is benchmarked against numbers Steve gave us himself.
The shape of the transition
At closing
$150K cash payment
Up front, day-one liquidity. Locks the deal in.
Years 1–3 · working phase
Steve & Lisa run Davidson Dental — 60% of gross fees
Compensation for the work, not the sale. Our team absorbs appraisal production, due diligence, and deal execution so Steve's time goes to clients and to mentoring a successor. Minimum 18-month commitment; beyond that, step-down at his pace — stay three years, stay ten.
During the working years
Successor development
The one ask: bring a successor up to speed so the business outlives the transition. David Tumbach is our candidate — evenings and showings first, then deals.
Year 4 onward · payout phase
Performance-based installments through Year 10
Sized by what the business actually produced in Years 1–3 — the average sets the base. Year 4 is the largest installment (55% of base), stepping down each year after. Share sale, so most of it shelters under Steve and Lisa's LCGE.
Indicative 10-year economics (base case)
Working compensation (Y1–3)Cash at close + purchase installments
~$783K
Working comp, Y1–3 (base case)
~$685K
Close + installments, Y4–10 (base)
~$1.47M+
10-year total — before any growth uplift
5% growth case ≈ $1.50M; co-branded flow pushes higher
The growth kicker is real, not theoretical. Stronger appraisals and back-office capacity help Steve win and close more of his own listings — and every extra core-book dollar in Y1–3 raises both his 60% comp and his Y4–10 payout. Collaboration overflow is additive on top: an override on deals that wouldn't otherwise exist.
The pipeline, handled
Practice
Location
Commission
Treatment
In-flight deals close cleanly inside the structure; the DSG transaction (~$140K, ~⅓ of a year's revenue) is carved out at 75/25 in Steve's favour, recognizing his pre-deal origination work.
What changes, what doesn't
Stays the same
Davidson Dental Appraisals & Sales name and branding — his name is the brand in Alberta; we have no interest in changing that
Steve's client relationships and the way he runs his book
Lisa's role, at her current level and on her own timeline
Gets better
Behind the Davidson name: institutional-grade 40-page appraisals (four valuation methods, full forecast scenarios) that win listings in a single meeting
Appraisal production, due diligence, and execution come off Steve's plate
Overflow deal flow from the collaboration pays him an override — money on business that wouldn't otherwise exist, with his core book untouched
A broader shelf for his clients — financing, insurance, wealth management, equipment procurement — deepening relationships during the very years his payout base is set
A successor in the building means he can step down without the business stepping down
Share-sale structure → LCGE for both Steve and Lisa
Chapter two — back home in the Maritimes
An option, not an obligation: for the later working years — or whenever he's ready — Steve originates from the East Coast and lets the machine do everything else.
Why it works there
Atlantic Canada has roughly 1,000 dental practices (est.) with an aging ownership base and almost no dental-specialty brokerage — sellers default to generalist business brokers or get approached directly by DSOs. A trusted dental-only name, carried by someone from home, travels well.
How it runs
Steve does what only Steve can — relationships, listings, seller hand-holding — from his home region. Everything heavy is already remote by design: appraisals, due diligence, financing, and legal coordination run through the same Farooq-engine back-end that serves Alberta. Local showings can lean on a part-time local associate as volume builds.
What it does for Steve
A working chapter on his own geography and his own terms — closer to home and family. East Coast deals are overflow — outside the 60% pool entirely: after the back-end's cut and direct deal costs, we split our portion with Steve at ~40–50% — travel and accommodation come off before the split. It extends his earning runway without extending the Alberta grind.
Sweetener
East Coast travel fund
Steve already flies home often — make it part of the deal: a capped $10–15K/yr business-development travel budget (flights, accommodation) for trips that pair family time with prospect work — target two or more seller conversations per funded trip. Receipted, reviewed annually, sunsets at his step-back. Total cost ~$30–45K over the working years — trivial against the deal, but it lands as "we pay for your trips home" and gets him working the East Coast network early.
East Coast economics (concept): example — $2M practice at 4% = $80K fee. The back-end (Farooq's engine and/or our team) takes its share, say 40% → $48K to DDAS. Travel and accommodation are real in a four-province territory, so the split should come after direct deal costs: $48K less ~$8K travel/accommodation = $40K pool → ~$20K to Steve. Splitting profit rather than revenue keeps the headline at 50% while making cost discipline a shared interest; the alternative is a lower flat share of our net (40–45%) with costs on us. To be settled at pilot. One boundary to keep clean: exploratory/BD trips draw on the travel fund; deal-execution travel nets against that deal's pool — never both for the same trip.
Pilot-sized by design: start with one or two listings through his existing East Coast network, no quota. One homework item before launch: provincial licensing for business brokerage (and any real-estate component of practice sales) differs across NS/NB/PEI/NL and needs a quick check.
David's seat: a partner-operator track into a business that already has clients, a brand, and a mentor — start part-time while keeping the day job, learn from the two best people in the market, and grow into running (and owning) the platform.
Why this works around a full-time job
Evenings are the job
Practice tours and showings happen after 5pm — dentists can't show their office while patients are in chairs. David's constraint is actually the industry's schedule.
A live mentor window
Steve has committed to 3–5 working years with successor training as an explicit part of his deal. This window is the whole opportunity — it won't exist later.
Back-end is covered
Farooq's team handles valuations, due diligence, lawyers, banks. David's ramp is relationships and deal management — not technical grunt work from day one.
A lane with no traffic
Farooq won't touch practices worth under ~$2M — and that's most of Davidson's book. David's training ground (small practices, buy-ins, transitions) has zero channel conflict with the senior partner in the ecosystem.
The track
Phase 1 · months 0–12 · part-time
Apprentice
Shadow Steve on showings, listings, and client meetings (evenings/weekends). Sit in on Farooq-side appraisal reviews to build valuation literacy. Own logistics on 1–2 small deals end-to-end. Keep the full-time job — this phase is deliberately additive.
Phase 2 · year 1–2 · transitioning
Deal lead + licensed
Lead smaller transactions: hygiene practices, associate buy-ins, transitions — the volume end of the pipeline (Edge, Glad Smiles, Westmor-sized deals). First per-deal economics. Parallel track: complete the LLQP and get life & disability licensed — insurance is the most natural cross-sell in every transition, and it becomes David's first personal recurring book. Decision point on going full-time as flow justifies it.
Phase 3 · year 2–4 · full-time partner
Operator & partner
Runs DDAS day-to-day as Steve steps back. Equity participation vests in. Manages the Farooq relationship at the deal level; owns the listing pipeline.
Phase 4 · year 4+
Managing Director, DDAS
The seat Steve built, professionalized: 15–20+ transactions/yr target, team underneath, founders at the strategy level only. Comp architecture in the $200–500K+ operator range the platform is designed around.
What David learns, and from whom
From Steve
The Alberta dentist network — introductions with a warm handoff, not a cold start
Listing origination: how practices come to market and why sellers choose a broker
Showings, seller psychology, managing both sides to a close
From Farooq's engine
What a genuinely better appraisal looks like — 40-page reports with four valuation methods and full forecast scenarios — and how to sell with it in one meeting
Deal execution: due diligence, financing, lawyer/bank choreography
The full-service pitch: appraisal + sale + tax + transition as one package
Economics concept (to be refined together)
Phase 1
Per-deal participation
Defined share of DDAS's fee on deals he works — paid for contribution, not hours. Low risk while employed elsewhere.
Phase 2–3
Profit share → equity
Graduating profit share as he leads deals; sweat-equity or phantom units converting to real DDAS equity at full-time commitment.
Phase 4
Partner economics
Meaningful ownership stake in DDAS plus MD compensation. Aligned with the platform's "hire operators, not employees" principle.
Parallel
The insurance book
Once licensed, every deal David touches can carry a disability or buy-sell policy — first-year commissions plus renewals that are his recurring revenue, growing with tenure. The channel extends to Farooq's 500+ clients (with an origination cut back to Farooq), so the book scales beyond DDAS's own deal flow.
The honest pitch to David: this is not a job offer — it's a chance to apprentice into a fee-generating business with a retiring founder, a ready pipeline, and an execution partner already proven at $1M+/quarter, at near-zero career risk because the ramp fits after 5pm. The equity is earned, the path is explicit, and the ceiling is the MD seat of the dominant dental M&A platform in Western Canada.
What we need from him now: 5–8 hours/week of evenings, a commitment to the 12-month apprentice phase, and a read on his appetite for the full-time jump in year 1–2 so we can sequence Steve's step-down honestly.